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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
PROFESSOR KATSORIS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.  
On behalf of the DeStefano Family, I’d like to welcome you here 
tonight.  For those of you who never met Al DeStefano, let me briefly 
describe him to you.  He started at Fordham Law School as an evening 
student, worked during the day, still managed to make the Law Review, 
and graduated at the top of his class.  He then went on to become a 
partner in the Becker firm, specializing in corporate matters, particularly 
mergers and acquisitions.  In his spare time, he devoted himself to 
numerous charitable endeavors and, as an adjunct professor on our 
faculty, shared his enormous knowledge and experience with our 
students. 
Former Dean of Fordham Law School and current Federal Circuit 
Judge Joseph McLaughlin, truly a great teacher in his own right, when 
once asked to describe the duties of a law professor, responded without 
hesitation: “He must be thoroughly versed in every aspect of the 
material and his role is not in creating more academics, but rather 
scrappy, smart lawyers who are ethical and engaged.”  I’m proud to say 
that Al DeStefano is just such a lawyer, and I might add the word 
compassionate as well. 
Indeed, I personally feel that the goal of the DeStefano Lecture 
series is to follow the McLaughlin rule, that is, to communicate with 
scrappy, smart lawyers who are ethical and engaged on topics of current 
interest.  In keeping with this tradition since its inception over a decade 
ago, the DeStefano Lectures have covered a wide range of timely and 
diverse topics such as: the need for market regulation; the demise of 
Enron and its auditor Arthur Anderson; strengthening the protection for 
investors; making our capital markets more transparent; the subprime 
mortgage meltdown; and corporate and governmental accountability. 
Last year, we were treated to Judge Rakoff’s thought-provoking 
lecture, entitled “Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an Age 
of Economic Expertise.”  Tonight we’re in for another treat.  Tonight’s 
speaker will cover the topic “Hiding Behind the Corporate Veil.”  
Interestingly, it was exactly one hundred years ago, 1912, that Professor 
I.  Maurice Wormser, of the Fordham faculty, wrote his famous article 
in the Columbia Law Review regarding piercing the corporate veil, 
where he analyzed various situations in which the concept of corporate 
entities should be ignored and the veil of limited liability lifted.  
Professor Wormser was a legend at Fordham Law School.  Indeed, 
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although he was truly an outstanding academician, he also fit the 
McLaughlin definition of being a smart, scrappy lawyer who was both 
ethical and involved.  Why did such a giant in the law choose the 
Columbia Law Review to launch his famous doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil?  There are several theories.   
The first is a simple explanation.  The Fordham Law Review was 
not yet in existence.  It began publication two years later in 1914 and 
Professor Wormser could not wait to issue his theory.  Another 
explanation is somewhat more complex.  Professor Wormser knew the 
Columbia Law Review was then, and would continue to be, one of the 
leading premier legal periodicals; and, he had a premonition that one 
hundred years later a professor from the Columbia School of Journalism 
would pick up the torch of justice in search of abuses by those who hide 
behind the corporate veil.  Does that sound far-fetched?  Perhaps.  But to 
me, the connection between piercing the corporate veil one hundred 
years ago and those who have lurked behind the corporate veil this past 
century seems compelling and more than just a coincidence.  I wish I 
could add that tonight’s speaker was a collateral descendant of Professor 
Wormser, but that would be wishful thinking. 
In any event, fraud, deception, misrepresentation, and perjury have 
occurred in the business community since Professor Wormser’s article a 
century ago.  There is no one more qualified to report on that subject 
than tonight’s speaker, who will discuss those who hide behind the 
corporate veil. 
James Stewart was born in Quincy, Illinois.  He graduated from 
DePauw University and Harvard Law School.  He is the Bloomberg 
Professor of Business Journalism at Columbia University Graduate 
School of Journalism.  He writes the Common Sense column for the 
Business Day section of the New York Times.  He contributes regularly 
to The New Yorker, and he was formerly Page 1 Editor of The Wall 
Street Journal. 
His awards are too numerous to list, but I will highlight just a few.  
He is the recipient of the 1988 Pulitzer Prize for The Wall Street Journal 
articles on the 1987 stock market crash and insider trading scandal.  He 
is a winner of the George Polk award and several Gerald Loeb awards.  
He is the author of eleven books, including Den of Thieves, and also the 
national best seller, DisneyWar, dealing with Michael Eisner’s 
tumultuous reign at Disney.  His latest book, Tangled Webs: How False 
Statements are Undermining America, examines several recent high 
profile cases to show how wrong-doers escape individual responsibility 
by invoking the legal concept of the corporation. 
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Never forgetting his alma mater, he serves on the Board of 
Advisory Trustees at DePauw University and also served as its past 
president.  In addition, he will be the principal speaker at this year’s 
graduation at DePauw University, at which time he will be awarded by 
DePauw the Bernard Kilgore medal for distinguished lifetime 
achievement in journalism.  I could go on and on, but you didn’t come 
here to listen to me.  Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to 
introduce to you James B. Stewart. 
LECTURE: HIDING BEHIND THE CORPORATE VEIL 
PROFESSOR STEWART: Thank you very much.  What a 
wonderful introduction.  I did not even know this 100-year anniversary 
was coming up, but I am delighted to learn that.  This was quite an 
unusual opportunity, being invited by a law school to address such a 
distinguished audience on the subject of corporate legal issues.  At first, 
I had a moment of panic thinking what I, a journalist, could possibly say 
to you.  And I believe I may be the first practicing journalist to give this 
lecture, so I’ll just warn you ahead of time that there will be a little more 
fact emphasis than there will be legal emphasis.  I have enjoyed slipping 
back to my legal roots and my legal training to try to weave the two 
together, and I have really enjoyed thinking about the subject and 
putting this talk together.  I have to give special thanks right at the 
beginning to two Fordham students who kind of served as my 
associates.  In fact, they made me feel like something that in life I never 
have been: a law firm partner with an array of talented, smart associates 
to deploy to do the heavy lifting—and at the same time, keeping the 
billable hours down.  And so I have to thank Megan Ferrer and Arielle 
Buss, who did some tremendous work and legal research for me in 
preparing this topic. 
There is a guy named Greg Lee, whom you have probably never 
heard of.  He was the Chief Administrative Officer of the poultry giant, 
Tyson Foods, and President of Tyson’s International Unit—one of the 
highest-ranking executives in the company.  And when he retired, he 
could hardly have gotten a better send-off from the company.  Here is 
what the press release said: 
“Greg spent 27 years helping build and grow Tyson Foods, so 
his leaving the company will not be easy,” said Dick Bond, Tyson’s 
president and CEO.  “He will be missed by all, but we take comfort 
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in knowing he will still be available on a consulting basis in the 
future.” 
“My career at Tyson has been rewarding in so many ways,” said 
Lee.  “It has been exciting to see the company grow from the small 
regional chicken company it was when I started, to the largest 
protein provider on the planet . . . .” 
“The Tyson family greatly appreciates Greg’s dedicated service 
to the company over the last three decades,” said Tyson Chairman 
John Tyson.  “He has been a stalwart team member wherever he was 
needed and we will miss having him here on a day-to-day basis.”1 
So Tyson paid Mr. Lee nearly one million dollars on the date of his 
retirement and awarded him a ten year consulting contract, which 
provided an additional $3.6 million in compensation.  Mr. Lee continues 
to be reimbursed for his country club dues, use of a company car, and 
enjoys, I’m quoting from his employment agreement, “[p]ersonal use of 
the Company-owned aircraft for up to one hundred (100) hours per year 
for the first five (5) years.”2  As you’ve already heard, the title of my 
lecture tonight is “Hiding Behind the Corporate Veil” and exhibit A is 
none other than Mr. Lee of Tyson foods.  In my opinion, Mr. Lee is 
lucky that Tyson Foods is paying his country club dues and not his bail 
bond.  Exhibits B and C are other high ranking Tyson executives who 
conceived, implemented, and even once they were detected, kept alive 
one of the most brazen foreign bribery schemes in recent corporate 
history.  It was a blatant violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.3  
Has anyone involved at Tyson been charged with a crime, let alone 
convicted of one?  No.  The Justice Department and the SEC, which 
investigated the affair, would not even name the alleged individual 
offenders, identifying them only by vague reference to their job 
description, such as VP International.4  You are hearing their names 
tonight only because I decided to take matters into my own hands and 
get to the bottom of what happened.  I was able to identify the three top 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Press Release, Tyson Foods Inc., Greg Lee - Tyson’s Chief Administrative 
Officer and International President - Announces Early Retirement (Apr. 3, 2007), 
http://www.tysonfoods.com/Media-Room/News-Releases/2007/04/Greg-Lee---Tyson-
s-Chief-Administrative-Officer-and-International-President---Announces-Early-
Retirement.aspx. 
 2. Tyson Foods Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 3, 2007). 
 3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006). 
 4. Plea Agreement at 14-16, United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 11-37 (Feb.  
10, 2011). 
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executives who, when I contacted them, not surprisingly, declined 
comment. 
So what actually happened at Tyson?  In late June 2004, a plant 
manager for one of Tyson Foods’ Mexican poultry processing plants 
sent a memo to headquarters in Springville, Arkansas.5  Two women on 
Tyson payroll who “most definitely [] [did] not work for Tyson Foods in 
Mexico,”6 were being paid over 30,000 pesos a month and had been for 
years.7  The Mexican women happened to be the wives of two 
veterinarians stationed at the plants as part of the Mexican government’s 
efforts to assure high sanitary and processing standards for the Mexican 
meat and poultry industries.8  The veterinarians certified the plant’s 
products as suitable for export, a step required by countries like Japan 
and increasingly sought after by Mexican consumers as well, as an 
assurance for quality and safety.  By withholding their certifications, the 
veterinarians could essentially halt exports of Tyson’s Mexican products 
or, as one executive present observed, create “problems at the plants.”9  
A few days after this missive, the plant manager’s revelations prompted 
a meeting of high-level Tyson executives at headquarters in 
Springdale.10  Someone present pointed out the obvious, which was that 
the purpose of the payment was to “keep the TIF veterinarians from 
making problems.”11  In short, to pay them bribes.  All participants at 
this meeting, including the then president of Tyson International, whose 
name is Greg Huett, the Vice President for Operations, and the Vice 
President of Internal Audit, evidently agreed that the payments to the 
wives had to stop.12   Around the same time, a company lawyer said he 
was seeking advice on the company’s “possible exposure” from the 
payments, evidently referring to Tyson’s potential criminal liability for 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. Id. at 15. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 16. 
 8. Id. at 13 (“The Government of Mexico administers an inspection program, 
called Tipo Inspección Federal (“TIF”), for meat-processing facilities.  Any company 
that exports meat products from Mexico must participate in the inspection program, 
which is supervised by an office in the Mexican Department of Agriculture 
(“SAGARPA”).”). 
 9. Id. at 15. 
 10. Id. (“Executive, VP International, VP Audit and others met in Springdale, 
Arkansas.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
2012] HIDING BEHIND THE CORPORATE VEIL 7 
maintaining fraudulent records and bribing foreign officials.13  And then, 
having apparently identified the serious legal and illegal lapses, the 
potential liability, and the need to stop these bogus payments to the non-
working wives, these high level executives “were tasked with 
investigating how to shift the payroll payments to the TIF veterinarians’ 
wives directly to the veterinarians.”14 
A subsequent statement of facts negotiated by Tyson’s lawyers and 
the Department of Justice, written in the all too passive voice typical of 
these documents, begs the question of just who “tasked” such an 
undertaking.  A memo written by Tyson’s audit department, titled 
“Tyson de Mexico - Payroll Memo,” stated “doctors will submit one 
invoice which will include the special payments formerly being made to 
their spouses along with there [sic] normal consulting services fees.”15  
The invoice for the payments to the veterinarian inspectors would be 
labeled as “professional honorarium.”16  The manager of the plant at the 
time charged with implementing this new scheme was a manager named 
Paul Fox.  So I wondered, what were these Tyson executives thinking?  
It’s hard to see how simply shifting the payments from the wives to the 
veterinarians did anything to mitigate the bribery scheme or the false 
descriptions of the payments.  If anything, it appears to me even more 
brazen.  Perhaps once the wives’ cover was blown by the plant manager, 
they saw no alternative if the goal was to keep the bribery scheme going.  
There is no indication anyone gave serious consideration to stopping the 
payments, but only to finding a new way to make them.  The President 
of International, Mr. Huett, who was the highest-ranking official at the 
meeting, communicated this resolution to Tyson’s Chief Administrative 
Officer, the Mr. Lee I mentioned earlier.17 
So the payments to the veterinarians continued.  Another plant 
manager subsequently complained to an accountant at Tyson 
headquarters that he was uncomfortable with this arrangement.18  The 
accountant went to Mr. Huett.  “He” meaning Mr. Huett, “agreed that 
we are OK to continue to make these payments against invoices (not 
                                                                                                                                         
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 16 (citing “Tyson de Mexico – Payroll Memo” drafted on or around 
August 26, 2004). 
 16. Id. (“Tyson increased the amount it paid to [a veterinarian] based on invoices 
for ‘professional honoraria’ by approximately the same amount that it had previously 
paid to the wives of the TIF veterinarians.”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 17. 
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through payroll) until we are able to get [the Mexican inspection 
program] to change,” the accountant informed the plant manager.19 
Now, Tyson has stressed that none of the products certified by these 
Mexican veterinarians taking the bribes ever made it to the US and 
apparently no sickness or fatalities have been traced to products 
processed at the plants.  But such concerns underscore the obvious, 
which is why bribing officials charged with protecting the public health 
is especially serious. 
The issue of these payments resurfaced in November 2006, and this 
time, Tyson did what it should have done two years earlier:  It retained 
an outside law firm, Kirkland and Ellis, which conducted an internal 
investigation and, under a government program intended to encourage 
voluntary disclosure of white-collar crime, turned the results over to the 
Justice Department and the SEC.20  The government’s ensuing multi-
year investigation ended last year when Tyson was charged with 
conspiracy and violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and agreed 
to resolve the charges with a deferred prosecution agreement and pay 
the four million dollar criminal penalty.21  The company paid an 
additional $1.2 million to settle related SEC charges that it maintained 
false books and records and lacked the controls to prevent payments to 
phantom employees and government officials.22 
But what about those at Tyson responsible for the bribery scheme?  
Corporations may have assets and liabilities, but they do not commit 
crimes.  Their officers, executives, and employees do.  And the 23-page 
letter agreement between Tyson and the Department of Justice, as well 
as the criminal information and the SEC’s public statement of facts, all 
withheld any names.  It would seem to me self-evident that if Tyson 
engaged in a conspiracy and violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
then someone at Tyson did so as well.  For violation of the FCPA’s 
bribery provisions, individuals can be fined up to $100,000 and 
                                                                                                                                         
 19. Id. (citing an email sent from Accountant to the plant manager at TdM). 
 20. James B.  Stewart, Bribery, but Nobody Was Charged, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/business/25stewart.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 21. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Tyson Foods Inc. Agrees to Pay $4 Million 
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Allegations (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-crm-171.html. 
 22. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Tyson Foods with FCPA Violations (Feb.  
10, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-42.htm. 
2012] HIDING BEHIND THE CORPORATE VEIL 9 
imprisoned for up to five years.23  For books and record violations of the 
FCPA, the penalties are fines of up to $5 million and a prison term of up 
to twenty years for individuals, and fines of up to $25 million for 
companies.24  I assumed the names were withheld because this 
investigation was continuing and further charges might be forthcoming.  
It turns out I was wrong.  The investigation is over, and the SEC and the 
Justice Department have said there will be no individual charges. 
Companies seem only too willing to go along with this, passing 
settlement costs onto shareholders while sweeping the details and even 
the names under the rug.  Gary Mickelson, a Tyson spokesman, declined 
to name any company officials involved when I asked him, but he said, 
“they’re either no longer with the company or they were disciplined.”25  
He declined to be more specific and I wondered just how exactly they 
were “disciplined.” 
So how have these individuals fared, the ones I identified by 
additional reporting?  Tyson announced in May 2006 that Greg Huett, 
the President of International, whom my research shows was heavily 
involved in the scheme, would be named to “another leadership position 
within the company.”26  SEC filings indicate he left in 2007 without any 
further comment from Tyson.  He is currently a director of publicly 
traded YUHE International, China’s largest producer of day-old broiler 
chickens, where he serves on the Audit and Compensation committees, 
and chairs the Nominating Committee.27  Paul Fox, the Mexican plant 
manager, was actually promoted by Tyson to Vice President, Processed 
Meats Operation and left a year later to become the Chief Executive of 
Dickinson’s Frozen Foods in Idaho.  He then became a Managing 
Director of Brazil-based Marfrig Group, one of the world’s largest meat 
and poultry producers, and currently serves as the Chief Executive 
Officer of O.K. Industries, an integrated chicken producer.  And of 
course, Mr. Lee got the glowing sendoff and the lucrative consulting 
                                                                                                                                         
 23. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
2C1.1 (2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011_Guidelines/Manual_ 
HTML/2c1_1.htm.   
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).  
 25. Stewart, supra note 21. 
 26. Press Release, Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Selects International Group Vice 
President; Other Management Changes Announced (May 23, 2006), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/tyson-selects-international-group-vice-
president-other-management-changes-announced-56525442.html. 
 27. YUHE Int’l Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 13, 2008). 
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contract along with other perks like use of the company plane.28  When I 
called for comment, everyone said this was the end of it and they felt 
that the settlement had largely achieved the government’s objectives, 
which were to stop the illegal conduct at Tyson and deter future 
instances.  But surely bribery, not to mention other forms of corporate 
wrongdoing, would be more effectively deterred if some individual was 
actually held accountable for it. 
Where has this idea come from?  That somehow corporations in the 
abstract can commit crimes?  Slowly but surely, the corporation has 
been anthropomorphized by American common and statutory law as 
much as any Disney movie has produced talking animals and birds.  As 
far back as 1819 in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,29 the 
Supreme Court ruled that a corporation, like a person, could enter into 
an enforceable contract.  In 1830, another Supreme Court case granted 
corporations the same property rights as those enjoyed by natural 
persons.30  From there, the corporation was on a slippery slope to full-
blown personhood.  As a matter of interpretation of the word “person” 
in the Fourteenth Amendment, US courts have extended many, although 
not all, constitutional protections to corporations.  And since the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission31 in 2010, upholding the corporation’s right to make 
unlimited political expenditures as an exercise of First Amendment 
protected speech, many have begun to wonder if this trend has gone too 
far.32 
That’s a separate issue from my talk tonight.  Still, the fictional 
notion that the corporation has the rights to enter into contracts, to own 
property, and to engage in other activities customarily associated with 
actual people, was quite slow to become embedded in the notion of 
criminal law.  Many wondered how an abstract entity, a collective of 
people, could act with a specific criminal intent necessary for 
commission of a crime.  But especially as the notion of vicarious 
                                                                                                                                         
 28. Tyson Foods Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 3, 2007). 
 29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 30. Soc’y for the Propogation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Pawlett, 29 U.S. (4 
Pet.) 480 (1830). 
 31. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 32. For an overview of the arguments against corporate personhood, see Susanna 
Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights after Citizens United: An Analysis of 
the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 209 (2011). 
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corporate liability and tort law expanded to cover corporate liability, in 
large part because of the deep pockets and generous recoveries that 
could often be obtained from corporations, criminal liability for 
corporate persons followed.  In 1909, the Supreme Court ruled in United 
States v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co.,33 that 
corporate criminal sanctions could be imposed if an employee had 
committed a crime, first, within the scope of his or her employment and 
second, for the benefit of the corporation.  That standard is still widely 
applied today.  And finally, the very first section of the US Code, Title 
1, Section 1 states that the word “person” includes “corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies and joint stock 
companies,” as well as individuals.”34  At this point, the personhood of 
the corporation is complete. 
Even so, the notion that corporations might commit crimes seems 
to have been largely seen as something that supplemented, rather than 
supplanted, individual liability.  In other words, individuals would be 
charged with crimes and then, on top of that, the corporation might also 
be held liable, in many cases, in order to collect financial damages for 
victims.   That has changed relatively recently.  Ironically, in the wake 
of major criminal scandals over the last two decades, starting with Enron 
and WorldCom, and continuing through the financial crisis, criminal 
investigations seem to have increased significantly, but convictions have 
not.  In the five years following Enron, only one major company, 
accounting firm Arthur Anderson, was actually convicted of a crime, 
and even that was subsequently overturned, although not in time to save 
the firm.35  Numerous individuals have been prosecuted and quite a few 
convicted, many of them, however, quite low on the corporate scale.  
And recently, even that trend seems to have diminished, with very few 
individuals being held accountable for corporate wrongdoing.  This 
appears in large part to be due to policies embraced in Washington by 
the Justice Department and the SEC, which favor deferred prosecution 
agreements such as that with Tyson. 
As the Tyson case indicates, the corporation itself rarely has any 
interest in seeing its executives brought to justice, particularly when 
                                                                                                                                         
 33. 212 U.S. 509 (1909). 
 34. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as 
well as individuals.”). 
 35. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Unanimously Overturn Conviction of Arthur 
Andersen, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/31/business/ 
31wire-andersen.html?pagewanted=all. 
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those executives might be at the very top of the hierarchy, including the 
CEO.  Now, why this would be the case is not entirely self-evident, at 
least to me, especially since their behavior has often brought tremendous 
embarrassment and financial damage to the institution they were 
purporting to serve.  But I believe there is a clue in the Tyson accolades 
for Mr. Lee, and the reference to him being a wonderful “team player.”36 
In my experience, there seems to be no higher accolade in corporate 
America than being called a “team player” or even a “TP,” as I’ve 
sometimes heard it abbreviated.  A “TP” displays a quality much prized 
by many organizations, which is loyalty—a quality prized far too much, 
in my view.  Loyalty is often elevated to the top of the ethical pyramid, 
above the rule of law, and the obligation to obey the law.  “Loyalty 
above all” is essentially the code of organized crime.  This is hardly 
limited to corporations, as scandals at Penn State and the Catholic 
Church have demonstrated, but it does seem to be particularly attractive 
within the corporate context. 
This impulse also extends to behavior that may be scandalous even 
though it may not reach the level of criminal conduct.  A vivid recent 
example occurred at the Hewlett-Packard Company, the world’s largest 
computer maker.  Let me read an excerpt from a remarkable letter from 
a lawyer that landed on the desk of Hewlett-Packard’s then Chief 
Executive, Mark Hurd.  And by the way, then tell me whether you think 
corporate law is boring.  Here is the quote: 
[She] was scared.  She was a nervous wreck but attempted to 
appear relaxed.  She sat down on one of two loveseats in the sitting 
room.  She was worried when you came over and sat directly next to 
her and put your arm on the back of the loveseat.  As you did so, 
your hand brushed across her breast.  It happened a second time and 
[she] said, “you know that you are touching my breast, right?”  You 
said, “oh, sorry, sorry” and then laughed it off.37 
This is a passage from the letter that triggered one of the most 
remarkable sagas in modern boardroom history and cost Mark Hurd his 
position as Chief Executive of Hewlett-Packard.  A year and a half after 
this letter landed on his desk, the question persists – how much of it is 
                                                                                                                                         
 36. Press Release, Tyson Foods Inc., supra note 1. 
 37. Letter from Gloria Allred, Attorney, Allred, Maroko & Goldberg, to Mark 
Hurd, CEO, Hewlett Packard Co. (June 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
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fiction?  It’s written in a breathless narrative style by Gloria Allred, the 
high profile lawyer who represents former H-P consultant, Jodie Fisher, 
the woman who is the “she” in the excerpt I read.  The letter was 
unsealed recently by the Delaware Supreme Court after Mr. Hurd 
intervened in impending shareholder litigation in an effort to keep it 
secret.  The letter is, to the best of my knowledge, unprecedented in the 
annals of boardroom history.  It purports to convey explicit dialogue, 
“[s]o, you’ll stay the night, right?  You’ll stay?”38  It explores the 
characters’ inner thoughts and states of mind, even Mr. Hurd’s.  “You 
were outraged and felt insulted by [Ms. Fisher’s publicist] and by Ms. 
Fisher,”39 “[s]he felt tired, irritated and depressed, sad and mad. . . .”40  It 
contains brand name details in glamorous foreign locations.  “You went 
in a town car from the [Ritz] hotel to Combarro Restaurant in 
Madrid.”41  And then it employs rarely used second person narration, 
consistently referring to Mr. Hurd as “you.”  In this regard, it joins 
bestsellers like Jay McInerney’s “Bright Lights, Big City,” and Terry 
McMillan’s “Waiting to Exhale,” as well as classic works by Nathaniel 
Hawthorne and John Updike.  I have to congratulate Ms. Allred.  It’s 
one of the few legal documents I can honestly describe as a page-turner.  
But stripped of its literary flourishes, it boils down to an alleged two-
year campaign by Mr. Hurd to have sex with Jodie Fisher, a former soft-
core movie actress who H-P hired as a consultant to help host so-called 
executive summit events for the company. 
In the course of those years, Ms. Fisher alleges Mr. Hurd let his 
hand brush against her breast, asked her to spend the night with him, 
asked her to hug him—and did hug her while she was dressed in a 
robe—once put his arms around her and “quickly kissed [her] on the 
lips,” asked her to go away with him, and said he could spend the rest of 
his life with her.42  She mentioned several occasions when they were 
alone together in his or her hotel room, unrelated to any alleged 
executive summit meeting, and where they sometimes chatted about 
movies and sports.  She insists she rebuffed all these approaches, there 
was no sexual activity, and as a result, her consulting contract was not 
extended.  Abruptly dropping the role of omniscient narrator, Ms. Allred 
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then concludes that Mr. Hurd’s behavior amounted to “the most 
egregious type of sexual harassment.”43 
Taken as true, Ms. Fisher’s allegations do seem to meet the 
threshold for sexual harassment in California, which is “verbal, visual or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature or of a hostile nature based on 
gender that were unwelcome and pervasive or severe.”44  But Mr. Hurd 
wasn’t asked to resign for sexual harassment and it’s not clear that the 
key elements of Ms. Fisher’s allegations are true.  She settled the matter 
and promptly shattered her credibility by conceding that the letter 
contained “many inaccuracies” without specifying what they are.45  She 
has since declined comment as she did when I tried to reach her. 
Putting the details aside, to believe Ms. Fisher, you have to accept 
her claims that Mr. Hurd, a married Chief Executive of a Fortune 500 
company, who by her account had plenty of other women at his 
disposal,46 pursued her for two years while being constantly rebuffed.  
And emails from her to Mr. Hurd suggest that whatever transpired 
between the two of them, Mr. Hurd’s attentions were hardly unwelcome, 
which is a critical element of any sexual harassment claim.  H-P 
commissioned an outside law firm, Covington and Burling, to 
investigate Ms. Fisher’s allegations.  And while it “did not show that 
Hurd had committed sexual harassment”, it “did reveal that Hurd had 
breached H-P’s standards of business conduct,” according to a summary 
by the Delaware Supreme Court.  In a letter to H-P employees at the 
time of his dismissal, H-P’s then interim Chief Executive, Catherine 
Lesjak, said Mr. Hurd “failed to disclose a close personal relationship he 
had with [a] contractor, [which] constituted a conflict of interest, failed 
to maintain accurate expense reports, and misused company assets.”47  
But at least four expense reports do list Ms. Fisher as being present.  
And the Allred letter cites frequent occasions when Mr. Hurd’s assistant 
dealt with Ms. Fisher as well as numerous meetings where Ms. Fisher 
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did indeed perform the hostess services for which she was hired and got 
“immediate and incredibly positive feedback from everyone” as she 
wrote in another email.  This hardly seems like concealment.   
So why did H-P dismiss Mr. Hurd?  Sticking to only the undisputed 
facts, there’s plenty of evidence that Mr. Hurd exercised dubious 
judgment, starting with the decision to hire a soft-core film actress as a 
facilitator at cocktail parties in the first place.  Ms. Fisher notes in her 
letter that she always flew first-class at a time when nearly all other H-P 
employees were consigned to coach and under orders to cut travel 
expenses.  No Chief Executive should spend time alone in a hotel room 
with a low-level employee or consultant of either sex, without a good 
reason, even if all they do is watch sports on TV. 
Other possibilities must be confronted.  When the board concluded 
that Mr. Hurd did not engage in sexual harassment, it may have been 
because he didn’t do any of the things that Ms. Fisher alleged.  The 
other possibility is that Ms. Fisher is lying, that she consented to his 
advances and indeed that they had a prolonged, consensual affair.  As I 
mentioned, under California Law, consent obviates any charge of sexual 
harassment. 
Those familiar with the board’s thinking have told me that board 
members felt that Mr. Hurd had committed a fundamental breach of 
trust that could not be repaired.  When questioned about his relationship 
with Ms. Fisher, board members felt Mr. Hurd was not forthcoming.  
The final straw came when he settled Ms. Fisher’s allegations, acting on 
his own initiative and paying her just over one million dollars from his 
pocket, little more than twenty-four hours before H-P lawyers were 
scheduled to meet with her to review the evidence. 
Now that’s what they told me.  Shareholders have never been told 
this.  Did any of this warrant Mr. Hurd’s dismissal?  H-P’s revenues, 
profits and share price soared under his leadership and he was widely 
hailed as one of the country’s most effective corporate Chief 
Executives.48  The fateful step to dismiss him had enormous 
consequences for H-P shareholders and plunged H-P into a period of 
protracted management turmoil.  It seems to have been calmed only 
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recently by the appointment of Meg Whitman as Chief Executive.49  The 
Delaware Supreme Court didn’t seem to make much of Ms. Allred’s 
allegations, characterizing them as “embarrassing” to Mr. Hurd, but 
agreeing with the trial court that Ms. Allred’s letter should be 
unsealed.50  Or was Mr. Hurd’s behavior so serious that he should have 
been fired for “cause,” which would have enabled H-P to deny him his 
$12.2 million severance package?  That’s the subject of ongoing 
litigation, with several pending shareholder suits alleging it was the 
board’s responsibility to do so.51  These questions are tough to answer 
without access to information and documents the board considered in 
making its decision, such as the Covington Report.  Curiously, H-P itself 
initially agreed to file the Allred letter under seal and it has refused to 
produce the Covington report, invoking the attorney-client privilege.  
While it’s easy to understand why Mr. Hurd would not want this 
material made public, it’s hard to understand why H-P would care, 
assuming that the documents indeed support the board’s decision to 
terminate him, but not for cause. 
If H-P wants to put all this behind it and dispel the perception that it 
had something to hide, it should waive the attorney-client privilege and 
make public all the relevant materials, especially since as the Delaware 
Court suggests, they’re likely to become public eventually anyway.  As 
is too often the case in such corporate battles, the biggest losers in all 
this are the shareholders.  They’re the plaintiffs in the various 
shareholder suits and H-P is spending their money to defend its board 
and ironically Mr. Hurd, since he’s indemnified under his former 
employment agreement.  H-P shares, which were trading at $46.50 on 
the day of Ms.  Allred’s letter, were at $23.46 today.52 
If Ms. Fisher’s allegations are fundamentally false, Mr. Hurd has 
been subjected to needless and unfair embarrassment, an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy, and scurrilous allegations.  But his marriage has 
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survived, he got his severance and he’s now president of Oracle, which 
seems unfazed by whatever happened at H-P.53  And Ms. Fisher, though 
she claims to have been “emotionally debilitated” and “spiraling 
downwards” at the time she wrote her letter, walks away with a seven-
figure settlement, far more than she could ever have hoped for as an H-P 
hostess or, for that matter, a “B” movie actress. 
In my view the corporate law is woefully inadequate in mandating 
disclosure of material information to shareholders, whether they involve 
criminal conduct, embarrassing conduct, or the reason for an executive’s 
termination.  They pay constant lip service to the notion of corporate 
democracy and shareholder rights.  But courts have consistently 
declined to extend the notion of materiality to the actual reasons for 
executive removal.  It’s deemed enough for shareholders to know that 
someone has been ousted and replaced. 
Shareholders cannot make meaningful decisions as to who should 
be elected to their boards of directors without adequate information with 
which to adequately judge their performance.  And in many cases, they 
are getting misleading—if not outright false—statements.  This often 
happens in the case of “resignations,” surely one of the most abused 
words in the corporate cannon.  Tyson may not have overtly lied in 
announcing Mr. Lee’s “retirement,” but it certainly omitted material 
information, that he was being forced to resign as part of a deferred 
prosecution agreement with the government, something that should have 
sent him to the exit in disgrace, rather than with the use of the corporate 
jet.  And shareholders shouldn’t have had to rely on a reporter to tell 
them that. 
The Hurd case is even more significant because the decision to hire 
and fire a CEO is surely one of the most important decisions a corporate 
board makes.  Yet, how can shareholders evaluate such actions if they’re 
deprived of the basis for knowing why an action was taken?  H-P’s 
sudden ousting of Mark Hurd accompanied by patently insincere, if not 
outright false explanations caused the stock to plunge, triggered a hasty 
and ultimately disastrous search for a successor, and it’s caused billions 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. Aaron Ricadela, Oracle Hires Ex-HP CEO Hurd as President as Phillips 
Departs, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 7, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2010-09-07/mark-hurd-joins-oracle-as-president-after-leaving-hp-as-phillips-
resigns.html. 
18 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
of dollars in shareholder losses.54  It is no wonder there are multiple 
shareholder lawsuits still working their way through the courts. 
What can be done about this state of affairs?  At the investigative 
and prosecutorial level, there must be a high-level recognition that 
whatever the evolution of the statutory and common law, corporations in 
fact are not people.  Punishing shareholders for corporate wrongdoings 
does little or nothing to deter future unlawful conduct.  Witness the 
blatant recidivism of Citibank and other major banks recently 
documented in a front page New York Times article that describes scores 
of repeated sanctions and warnings not to repeat illegal behavior that fell 
upon deaf ears.55 
In my view, deferred prosecution agreements are simply a lazy and 
inexpensive way, eagerly embraced by corporations for obvious reasons, 
for individuals to evade accountability and to sweep corporate 
wrongdoing under the rug.  They should be curtailed, if not halted 
altogether.  Judges—especially those in Delaware who handle the bulk 
of corporate cases—also in my view need to take a much broader view, 
especially about requiring corporations to disclose misconduct by high-
level officials when it is potentially criminal or results in an executive’s 
termination.  The SEC should simply not allow companies to announce 
that their executives have “resigned” when these resignations aren’t 
voluntary. 
Corporations are undoubtedly one of the most effective and 
extraordinary creations of modern society.  But by insulating individuals 
from the consequences of their behavior, they pose systemic risk, as we 
have seen just recently with the financial crisis.  Americans are hungry 
for accountability and thus far, they have seen very little of it.  
Corporate law could play a major role in restoring public confidence in 
markets, corporations, and the economy, if it returns to its roots in the 
public interest and stops doing the bidding of the wealthy and powerful 
entities it is called upon to regulate. 
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